Dissertation:

Publications & Working Papers:

Abstract: This paper addresses the critique that IMF austerity programs hurt the poor, but we do so with an eye toward whether the effects of austerity programs are mediated by domestic political factors in the recipient country. One drawback of the literature as it currently stands is the absence of any serious theorizing about the role of domestic politics in shaping the effects of IMF programs. We show that there is good reason to believe that the domestic political environment influences the effects of austerity. Our findings are noteworthy. Contrary to recent research by the IMF, we show that IMF programs do hurt social spending, and, perhaps counterintuitively, that this effect is particularly pronounced in democratic countries. We demonstrate that observed differences between democracies and non-democracies in terms of their spending priorities diminish or vanish in the presence of IMF programs. We also show that this is due to a political calculus whereby democracies decrease spending on those programs associated with the least organized interests.

  • Particularism and Public Goods: The Effect of Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote on Education Spending and Performance (with Allen Hicken)  The American Journal of Political Science.  52:1 (January 2008), 109-124.
Abstract:  This paper explores how features of the electoral and party system affect the efficiency of education spending in developing democracies. While we concur with existing literature that finds that democracies spend more on education than non-democracies, we demonstrate that the effect of greater spending on education outcomes depends on the type of democratic institutions in place. We argue that where the party system emphasizes political particularism resources are allocated less efficiently and the effect of increased spending on literacy is diminished. We test our hypotheses using data on education spending and performance in over 40 developing democracies since 1978. We find that though personal vote systems spend just as much on education as party vote systems, particularism in personal vote systems dampens the marginal effect of increased education spending on illiteracy and at its highest levels particularism completely undermines the positive effects of increased education spending on literacy.

  • Openness, Uncertainty, and Social Spending:  Implications for the Globalization - Welfare State Debate (with Irfan Nooruddin).  Under review after invitation to revise and resubmit
Abstract: We extend the literature on openness and spending in developing countries arguing that the effect of increasing openness depends on both regime type and the level of openness. Democracies respond to increases in openness by increasing spending while dictatorships decrease spending. However, the degree to which countries pursue the strategy of choice depends on the level of openness. In autarkic countries, an increase in import competition has ore severe consequences for perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. In response, government management of openness will be more vigorous under these conditions regardless of whether the leader increases or decreases spending. Economic selection mechanisms at work will produce an outcome wherein, at higher levels of openness, further import liberalization has smaller effects on perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. Hence, both the demand and the supply of government management of openness will be lower.
 
Abstract:  In this paper we examine the consequences of party system nationalization. We argue that the degree to which party systems are nationalized or fragmented should affects the  provision of public benefits by governments. When political competition at the national level occurs between parties that represent specific sub-national constituencies, then the outcomes of policy debates and conflicts can lead to:  a) an oversupply of pork-barrel policies and an undersupply of nationally-focused public goods. We test our argument using a data on infant mortality, DPT and measles immunization rates for 58 states.  We find that party system fragmentation is a barrier to improvements in these health indicators. Specifically, fragmentation hinders states’ convergence towards international heath standards.
 
  • "Rules, Collective Punishment, and Popular Mobilization in Nondemocratic Regimes" (with René Lindstädt) In Progress